View 6/2001

The Contrarian's View


Vol. XV, #11, June 25, 2001


The Contrarian's View is published 11 times per year on a mostly-irregular schedule, and the views expressed are those of the author and editor, Nick Chase. Because nobody can predict the future, results of past suggestions or recommendations are no guarantee of future results. Material in this publication may be freely quoted provided proper attribution is given to its source. Subscription rate: Free on the Internet through the World-Wide Web service at Assumption College. Using your favorite Web-browsing program, Open URL http://nick.assumption.edu. Mailed paper subscriptions, one year for $39 to The Contrarian's View, 132 Moreland Street, Worcester, Massachusetts 01609. There is a limit of 50 paid subscribers at one time; please check for availability before sending any money. Sorry, Visa and Mastercard are not available. Overseas subscription rate, U.S. $54. Unsolicited material sent to us by UPS or by courier other than the postal service is refused and returned to sender! Phone: (508) 757-2881


THE IRVING FISHER PHP AWARD

Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau. I do not feel there will be soon if ever a 50 or 60 point break from present levels.... I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher within a few months. - Irving Fisher (Ph.D. in economics), Oct. 17, 1929.

During the bubble I would periodically identify some of the quotes which I printed in the "Quotes for the Month" section of each issue as candidates for the "Irving Fisher PHP Award", "PHP" for "permanently high plateau" per economist Fisher's unbelievably stupid statement of October 1929. Now that the bubble is (at least temporarily) deflated, I think it's time to look back on these quotes, from a popped-bubble perspective, and make the awards.

Irving Fisher PHP Award for 2000. And the candidates are:

Our business plan called for us to build a small and profitable company, but we are a large and unprofitable company. That has been a conscious decision. We were profitable in December of 1995, but that is the worst mistake any company could have made. - Jeff Bezos [Amazon CEO] (June 2000 issue).

There is very little evidence to suggest that rising debt burdens on the part of households per se, are a trigger for an economic recession. Most people have a generally good idea of how much debt they can carry, and they don't go beyond it.... Consumer debt has been a remarkably beneficent force in moving people into the middle class in this country over the last two or three generations. And it continues to be a very potent and very desirable financial institution. - Alan Greenspan [July 25, 2000] (July 2000 issue).

Tough choice. Timeperson Bezos seemed to think that perpetually losing money is a proper business model.... only while the Street validated him, of course. But the prize goes to Mr. Bubblemania himself, Uncle Al Greenspan, who apparently has no problem with consumers taking on (what I think are) unsustainable levels of debt. How completely inappropriate for a central banker.

Irving Fisher PHP Award for 1999. And the candidates are:

[The] current rally will last for as much as two years without any major correction. This thing is beautiful. Buy! - Ralph Acampora (January 1999 issue).

While bubbles that burst are scarcely benign, the consequences need not be catastrophic for the economy. The bursting of the Japanese bubble a decade ago did not lead immediately to sharp contractions in output or a significant rise in unemployment. Arguably, it was the subsequent failure to address the damage to the financial system in a timely manner that caused Japan's current economic problems. Likewise, while the stock market crash of 1929 was destabilizing, most analysts attribute the Great Depression to ensuing failures of policy. And certainly the crash of October 1987 left little lasting imprint on the American economy. - Alan Greenspan [June 17, 1999] (July 1999 issue).

While Ralph Acampora looks ridiculous in hindsight (it was "beautiful" for only about another year, and really ugly thereafter), as Wall Street shills go he does not particularly stand out, so the award goes to.... you guessed it!.... again to everybody's favorite Sugar Daddy, Alan Greenspan, who clearly believes that central bankers have the clout to forever prop up consumer confidence and prevent deflationary accidents and depressions. Mr. Moral Hazard should know better.

Irving Fisher PHP Award for 1998. And the candidates are:

All the traditional old tools that Wall Street has been following are wrong, out of date, and they do not work. The dividend yield doesn't work and price/earnings ratios don't work. Also, specialist shorting, insider trading, I could go on and on. All on the garbage heap. - Joe Granville (May 1998 issue).

The bubble that we saw in Japan is going to happen here. But, of course, that's a long way off. - Don Wolanchuk (May 1998 issue).

Stocks are trading at undervalued levels.... We believe that market action in recent weeks represents an overreaction to incremental information. - Abby Joseph Cohen [August 5, 1998] (September 1998 issue).

This expansion will run forever. - Rudi Dornbush [MIT economics professor, July 30, 1998] (September 1998 issue).

...we have had a market correction rather than the start of a bear market.... Prepare for a market that will rise 25% to 40% in the next 18 months. - Kenneth Fisher (October 1998 issue).

In my opinion, the U.S. stock market is clearly back on track! The major catalyst that has brought us to this point was the decision by the Federal Reserve Board to lower interest rates and, more importantly, add reserves to the system.... The Federal Reserve has acted decisively, and it is more than likely that Mr. Greenspan will abstain from any further interest rate cuts provided the U.S. economy remains on an even keel. - Joe Battipaglia (October 1998 issue).

A bubble wouldn't be possible without a cheering squad in the media, as analysts who should know better become blind to history. Joe Granville is a wonderful entertainer and certainly would deserve the award, but it goes to the writer of the stupidest quote of all, the recession-blind economist Rudi Dornbush. "Forever" is a very, very long time.

Irving Fisher PHP Award for 1997. And the candidates are:

Despite today's low inflation, cash is a catastrophe as an investment. ....whoever said "it takes money to make money" oversimplified the concept. It takes money to buy stocks, and stocks are what make money. In a sense, a stock plan and a retirement plan are synonymous. - Janet Vega (February 1997 issue).

I don't see any kind of blowup event that's going to cause the market to crash. The market does need a bit of digestion time before it goes up sharply again, but the only real risk I see is that some kind of speculation froth re-emerges. - Neil Hokanson (February 1997 issue).

While stock prices appear expensive to some, prices are justified by the likelihood of continued growth in corporate earnings. Inflation fears are muted, bond yields have fallen back from their midsummer highs, and there is less likelihood of recession. - Abby Joseph Cohen (February 1997 issue).

....I became very concerned when I saw this extreme proliferation in the number of these [mutual] funds until today we have over 8000 of them. I could only see such growth as tracing out a huge parabolic curve heading toward certain collapse. I was wrong, very wrong. Now I see that this astounding growth is an epochal change, such as the steam engine, the automobile, the airplane, the computer, and the internet. Mutual funds are here to stay and their continued existence is as certain as death and taxes. Now I see them as a stabilizing factor. - Joe Granville, 2/97 (March 1997 issue).

With leveraging there will always exist a remote possibility of a chain reaction, a cascading sequence of defaults that will culminate in financial implosion if it proceeds unchecked. Only a central bank, with its unlimited power to create money, can with a high probability thwart such a process before it becomes destructive. Hence, central banks will of necessity be drawn into becoming lenders of last resort... central banks are led to provide what essentially amounts to catastrophic financial insurance coverage. Such a public subsidy should be reserved for only the rarest of disasters.... We have the responsibility to prevent major financial market disruptions... if necessary in rare circumstances, through direct intervention in market events. - Alan Greenspan, January 14, 1997 (April 1997 issue).

I don't see a deflationary bust in this country, nothing like the 1930s. They might have something like that in Asia, if they don't take care of their problems. But I don't see it here. - Martin Zweig (November 1997 issue).

The media suggest that everyone is fully invested in the stock market. I see no large-scale public participation.... The U.S. stock market will not go bust for many, many decades, and will definitely not penetrate the 1987 low for at least 100-150 years. It will most likely remain in a sideways pattern for many, many years, but at levels much greater than today's (S&P 500 to levels of 2200-3200). In fact, this Spring's lows will not be broken to the downside for 100-150 years. - Paul Zipotto (November 1997 issue).

This is not the top of the Great Bull Market. Before the end of 1997, we will see just the beginning of the next leg of this bull market that will last another 14 years. The Dow will close 1997 at a new all-time high or very close to it. The Dow will reach 10,000 in the year 2000 and Dow 15,000 by the year 2005.... Faster worldwide economic growth with declining inflation and increased productivity from an explosion of technology are the single best reasons to remain optimistic about what is happening in the world today. - Donald Rowe (November 1997 issue)

When Mr. Greenspan said the market suffered from irrational exuberance, he got it exactly backwards. What the market really suffers from is an insufficient appreciation of this exuberant economy.... Once stock prices begin to reflect the expectation that earnings can increase at anything like that 20% rate, then Dow 12,000 will very quickly become a reality. That's where Mr. Greenspan gets it wrong - the fact that prices reflect not just present earnings, but the growth rate of earnings. - Mike Astrachan (November 1997 issue).

The bears, in a time machine locked into the past, view this new world with total bewilderment. Attempting to bring them into this world, I would simply tell them to switch their sights to world population trends, the current sharply improved level of human intelligence, and a spreading trend toward a new level of world prosperity.... I have advanced the idea that we have a new people's market.... now, for the first time, we can see the public as the smart money and the professional element as the dumb money, a reversal in thinking of mammoth implications. - Joe Granville (November 1997 issue).

The time to be concerned is when the public is fearful.... But the public is not about to turn fearful. It is far too well-educated to fall for all of the 1929 scare talk.... They have a better grasp on the market than any previous public.... They are exposed to more knowledge about the stock market than any previous public.... And it doesn't stop there. They are preparing the next generation to be even smarter. - Joe Granville (November 1997 issue).

Had it not been for the discreet, skilful teamwork of Rubin and Greenspan, the world's financial cops, we would probably be in the middle of an international catastrophe. They have provided a textbook example of how a great power should use its influence to quietly press other nations to constructive action, without publicly humiliating them. - Eric Margolis (December 1997 issue).

I think the chances of a 1930s-style deflation are trivial. You can only have that kind of deflation if you have a bad monetary policy. Deflation is the easiest thing in the world to avoid; you just print more money. - Milton Friedman (December 1997 issue).

Mmmmm... lots of good choices here. We have Alan Greenspan, again, with his justifying "direct intervention in market events". But we already gave him an award for thinking he can indefinitely prop up confidence, so we'll pass on this one. Then Janet Vega's "stock plan and a retirement plan are synonymous" (no room for bonds here) is tempting, as is economist Milton Friedman's unusually dense (for him) confusion of asset deflation with destruction of the currency. But this time, the winner is that irresistible showman, Joe Granville, with his declamation that the explosion in mutual funds is an "epochal change". Somebody should let Joe know that as the NASDAQ has cratered, the number of mutual funds is shrinking because the fund companies are folding the weak sisters into funds with better track records. And as for funds being a "stabilizing factor", they said that about the investment trusts in 1929.

Irving Fisher PHP Award for 1996. And the candidates are:

I'm making 38 to 40 percent in the stock market and don't want to tie up my money in real estate. - Virginia attorney Diana Bork, after (successfully) shopping for a 10%-down, adjustable-rate, interest-only payments mortgage on a new near-$1 million home. (January 1996 issue).

How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decades?.... And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? ....We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy.... [We] ....should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy.... evaluating shifts.... must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy. - Alan Greenspan, December 5, 1996. (December 1996 issue).

Boy, it's tempting to sock it to Uncle Al again for his now-famous "irrational exuberance" comment (also known as the "Greenspan put"). But we have already rewarded him with a PHP for this fallacious reasoning in more recent years, and besides, there is something really compelling about Diana Bork's comment, because it is so symptomatic of how the clueless get sucked up into a bubble. So she gets the 1996 award.

Actually, I have thought of her quote often during the past year or two. If she was making "38 to 40 percent" in stocks, it sure wasn't in the blue chips. She had to be buying tech-type stuff in the NASDAQ market. If she was also the buy-and-hold type, then the past year's NASDAQ bear market must have at least brought her back to breaking even, and probably put her under water, because she would have been continuing to buy at ridiculous prices for the intervening five years. Meanwhile, she has no additional equity in her home other than that provided by market appreciation. Borrowing on real estate with only 10% down to (probably) lose money doesn't seem like a very good deal to me.

If any reader knows Ms. Bork and how she actually made out, five and a half years later, please pass it on. I'm really curious.

Let's close with a few more consistently-wrong quotes from Fisher:

There may be a recession in stock prices, but not anything in the nature of a crash. (September 5, 1929).

The end of the decline of the Stock Market will probably not be long, only a few more days at most. (November 14, 1929).

For the immediate future, at least, the outlook [for stocks] is bright. (early 1930).


QUOTES FOR THE MONTH

MZM (money of zero maturity, commonly known as 'cash') has been rising at a 21.6% rate. $1 trillion has been added to the money supply over the last year. - Bill Bonner

Over the past 31 weeks (since the most recent "reliquefication" was commenced back in October) broad money supply has surged $634 billion, a growth rate of 15.4%. - Doug Noland

Greenspan and his posse of bankers at the Fed can lower interest rates until Doomsday and it won't do any good. And for two reasons. 1. When you are drowning in debt, the last thing you need is more debt, and 2) if you have already defaulted on some debt, you know that any new money you get your hands on is going to be pursued by a ravenous pack of lawyers and their angry clients. But the only way to keep the whole thing from collapsing is to keep plowing more money into what is essentially bankrupt already. Lose a million of Other People's Money or lose a billion, what's the difference to you? Besides, what can it hurt? And there is the chance that it might even work out! It never has before, but it might this time! - Richard Daughty

Outright worrying, if not frightening, is the total absence of any effect of this quick succession of rate cuts on the U.S. bond market... this interest rate [the fed funds rate] has lost its former central importance in the financial system simply due to the fact that the activity of borrowing and lending in the U.S. ...has shifted heavily away from the banks and towards the markets and a huge panoply of non-bank financial intermediaries that largely fund themselves in the money market. - Kurt Richebacher

Greenspan is probably right. Inflation is not threatening the U.S. economy - not yet. Deflation is the threat. At least bond buyers seem to think so. The gap between the 10-year Treasury notes and inflation-indexed TIPS has fallen below 2%, suggesting either that bond buyers believe inflation will be below 2% for the next two years...or that they've lost their minds. - Bill Bonner

"Savings seen as threat to the economy," warns a headline from the Chicago Tribune. Can anything be done to stop this menace? Of course, much is being done. Mr. Greenspan and his band of merry central bankers are doing all they can. The fed funds rate has been cut more aggressively than at any time in history. Likewise, the money supply is growing at the fastest rate since the late '70s. In short, our central bankers are mounting an effort to debauch the currency worthy of a gigolo in a finishing school.... A bigger risk is that baby boomers will discover savings as they once discovered sex, drugs and rock & roll. They may even come to like the idea...and think they invented it. And perhaps they will even do it, like everything else they do, to excess.... 80% of the population has no more than 8 months' worth of financial reserves.... After the Dow has lost 35% of its value...and the Nasdaq 60%...will baby boomers continue spending at the same rate and rush back into the stocks that have just burned them? Or, approaching retirement and stocked up on durables, will they do what consumers in similar circumstances have always done: Cut back on spending...and place the savings elsewhere? ... When the baby boomers recognize that they face a stretch of time without capital gains from stocks - or even losses - they will decide to increase savings in other ways.... if they save at only one third the prevailing real rate for the 1990s - that is, at 5% - they would have to forego $350 billion of spending each year. This would subtract 3.5% from the GDP - effectively guaranteeing recession for many years to come. - Bill Bonner

....The years ahead could be a difficult test of patience for those maintaining a fully invested approach to the stock market. Of course, the "buy and hold" investment style tends to reach its peak popularity at the tail end of a secular bull market, along with the notion that stock market investing is a one-way road to riches. However, in the event that we have entered a new secular bear market trend, we would expect to see a series of cyclical bull markets and secular bear markets over a very long period of time.- Bob Brinker

It is a historic fact that every great financial crisis has been preceded by excessive confidence and absurdly inflated expectations that misled consumers and businesses to overextend themselves during the boom. One cannot explain the Great Depression of the 1930s with a collapse of confidence without pointing to the prior creation of inordinate confidence and expectations that had propelled the earlier borrowing and spending binges. Confidence, too, can be driven to dangerous excess. Yet, never forget: credit excess is the indispensable primary condition. While "New Era" ballyhoo had also played an important role in fuelling the boom of the 1920s, it definitely pales in comparison to what happened in this respect during the 1990s. The trumpeted claims of economic miracles resembled more Hollywood style than that of the world's leading financial center. It happens that Mr. Greenspan outdid everybody else in creating those exuberant expectations not only by his policy but even by his mouth.... There manifestly remains a widespread conviction that, thanks to Mr. Greenspan's rate cuts, the good times will soon return. Just look at P/E ratios. Most of them are higher than a year ago as profits have fallen even faster than stock prices. We would say that this rather reflects overconfidence. Not understanding the causes of the high-tech collapse and still convinced of the Greenspan magic, expectations remain grossly in excess of what can reasonably be expected of the economy. Few people are ready to sweep the miracle stories of the past few years into the dustbin. - Kurt Richebacher

What menaces the U.S. economy and Wall Street is not a lack of confidence, but too much of it. Investors were so confident that stocks would rise in price that they bought shares at preposterous prices. Businessmen, feeling the whoosh of easy money in their hair, increased investment in all manner of projects, some sensible but many not. And consumers, confident that the good times would last forever, stopped saving altogether. Confidence, a virtue in moderation, turned out to be a vice in excess - like a drunken soldiers on leave in a foreign country, Americans thought they could get away with anything. - Bill Bonner

If anything, bankers have evolved into even less intelligent forms of life. Instead of loaning money to risky Internet start-ups, they now purchase stock in risky start-ups through their venture capital subsidiaries. For example, JP Morgan Chase's venture capital subsidiary invested more than $9 billion - or 35% of the entire company's tangible net worth - in various start-ups and (ad)venture funds. If bankers are making better loans it is only because their VC subsidiaries found the least credit-worthy borrowers before the loan officers could. Bankers never met a bubble they didn't like. - Eric Fry

The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold... Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as the protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard. - Alan Greenspan [1963]

We all must face the inevitability of death and the loss of loved ones. We watch our parents age and try to prepare for that day when they will no longer be among us. No matter how hard we try, their deaths still shock us, but we find a way to grieve and move on. Our children are another matter. No parent is ever prepared for the loss of a child. It doesn't matter if death comes in the suddenness of an auto crash, a senseless violent act or the lingering pain of a debilitating disease, you can't just grieve and move on when a child dies. You scream at the heavens, ask why and wait for answers that never come. - Doug Thompson


STOCK MARKET OUTLOOK

Read this section and die of boredom, for my view has not changed. Stocks will, I think, mostly tread water with a slight upward bias into the fall. The Fed will undoubtedly cut the discount and/or Federal funds rate again this week (probably by the time you read this), and it will either be what investors expect (1/2%), and stocks will yawn, or it will be less and stocks will suffer for a few days until the Fed injects more liquidity into the system. Regardless, the fireworks are unlikely to arrive until the fall and winter, when the Fed's bubble-reflating efforts finally take hold.

Though stocks promise to give a nice positive return over about the next year, I remain primarily a bond bull. As the "Japanese scenario" unfolds, high-quality bonds will trace out a multiyear rise in price. (Junk bonds are another matter.... best to stay clear of them for awhile.) Commodities futures and bond prices are telling us that Greenspan is right about inflation for the intermediate term.... inflation is not an immediate threat (but deflation is!). Bonds like disinflation or deflation. Over the next 12 months, a blended portfolio of stocks and bonds promises to deliver a reasonably safe and meaningful return.


PORTFOLIO REVIEW

The combined performance of the portfolios (including predecessors, but excluding "PIG" and TIAA-CREF) from January 1987 to the present, adjusted for the dilutive effect of added shares, is -1.57%, for a compound annual rate of return of -0.09%. For comparison purposes, from January 1, 1987 to June 22, 2001 (14.474 years), the CREF stock unit value (whose performance closely parallels the S&P 500 with dividends reinvested) has risen 478.92%, for a compound annual rate of return of 12.98%. WARNING: I am a rotten stockpicker. Prices shown are as of June 22.

A. "Phoenix" -real portfolio, begun on October 1, 1995.

SUMMARY - "Phoenix":

             Original cost (adjusted):   $ 4,998.21
             Present value:              $ 4,140.54
             Increase:                   $  -857.67  [-17.16%]

The performance of this portfolio and its predecessors ("Hedger's Delight", "Present and Future Income", "Crapshooter's Folly") from January 1987 to the present is -1.65%, for a compound annual rate of return of -0.09%.

COMMENT on "Phoenix": There is no change since the last issue

B. "Professors' Investment Group (PIG)" - investment club portfolio.

SUMMARY - "PIG":

             Original cost:         $ 9,024.00
             Present value:         $15,993.44
             Increase:              $ 6,969.44  [+77.23%]
COMMENT on "PIG": At their mid-June meeting (I couldn't be there) the PIGs actually acted on one of my recommendations, which I had submitted in an e-mail. Based on what I had written in the April issue of The Contrarian's View, about investing in the future maker of "Palmphones", I suggested that Nokia (the cellphone manufacturer) might be the purest play of those with market clout.... if it decides to get into the Palmphone business, there's no guarantee that it would, but if the cellular industry goes in the direction I think it will, it's likely they will. Also, Nokia had just reported quarterly earnings a few cents shy of analysts' expectations, and the stock was taking a real beating, and there was a window of opportunity to buy it before its dead-cat bounce. (End-of-quarter reports are coming up for mutual funds, time to get rid of the bodies.... "What, Nokia? Did we own that?") As tech stocks go, this is almost a value item.... a projected P/E of less than two dozen, a decent balance sheet and the company pays a dividend! Maybe I should miss more meetings, so more of the stuff I suggest will be bought.... when I'm there to defend myself, nothing happens with my suggestions. The PIGs have a tendency to buy stocks of companies with names at the beginning of the alphabet.... now we've made it to "N", that represents real progress.

I also, finally, found the time to research and buy a fund of Japanese stocks. The biggest stumbling block was the minimum investment.... $2500 for most of the Japanese sector mutual funds, those that had lower minumums you wouldn't want to own. The PIGs said, only $1000, so I eventually settled on an exchange-traded index fund for Japanese stocks which more-or-less tracks the Nikkei. We had to pay a brokerage commission, but if we hold this for any length of time the tax efficiency (minimal distributions) and very low management fees will more than make up for it.

The PIGs' Web page is at http://www.assumption.edu/HTML/Faculty/Kantar/WPigs.html

C. Roth rollover IRA - real portfolio, includes commissions:

SUMMARY - IRA:

             Original (1983-86) cost:  $ 8,326.19
             Present value:            $10,993.97
             Increase:                 $ 2,667.78   [+32.04%]

The performance of this portfolio (including its predecessors) from January 1, 1987 to the present is 0.24%, for a compound annual rate of return of 0.01%.

COMMENT on IRA: There is no change from the last issue.

D. CREF Pension plan; I switch between indexed stock/bond/money funds:


Date           Sold            Bought
13Mar1992          stock @ 56.65      MM @ 13.41
29Apr1992          MM @ 13.48         bond @ 31.19
19Jun1992          bond @ 32.14       MM @ 13.55
29Jun1992          MM @ 13.57         stock @ 56.74
24Jul1992          stock @ 56.76      MM @ 13.61
29Oct1992          MM @ 13.72         stock @ 58.61
23Dec1992          stock @ 61.48      MM @ 13.78
16Jan1995          MM @ 14.83         equity-index @ 26.44
20Jan1995          eq-index @ 26.19   MM @ 14.84
30Oct1997          MM@ 17.24          bond@47.56 (27.17%)
30Oct1997          MM@ 17.24          i-i bond@26.12 (27.17%)
11Feb1998          bond@ 48.84        MM@17.52 (27.17%)
11Feb1998          I-I bond@ 26.23    MM@17.52(27.17%)
16Jun1998          MM@ 17.84          TIAA Traditional (45.87%)
23Sep1999          MM@18.99           I-I bond@27.56 (53.32%)
17-18May2000       rate adjustment to 7.25% in SRA
12-13Jul2000       rate adjustment to 7.5% in SRA
8Jan2001           TIAA Traditional   bond@58.62 [22.77%]
8Jan2001           TIAA Traditional   eq-idx@75.79 [4.56%]
1Feb2001           i-i bond@31.78     eq-idx@80.84 [26.76%]
Values, 22Jun2001: stock, 172.62 equity-index, 72.67 MM, 20.99; bond, 60.34;
inflation-indexed bond, 33.29; TIAA current yield in SRA, 7.5% (new money at 6.5% through June 30, 2001)

Gain, 1988: 18.91%; 1989: 14.48%; 1990: 8.28%; 1991: 27.93%; 1992: 10.20%; 1993: 3.08%; 1994: 4.07%; 1995: 4.80%; 1996: 5.28%; 1997: 5.38%; 1998: 5.72%; 1999: 5.12%; 2000: 9.99%
Gain, January 1 through March 31, 2001: -2.10%
Total gain since January 1, 1988 (13.25 years): 210.19%
Compound annual rate of return: 8.92%   (My long-term target: in excess of 10%)
Gain shown excludes the impact of additional monthly cash contributions.
Buying CREF stock on January 1, 1988 and holding it gained 426.15%, for a compound annual rate of return of 13.36%.

COMMENT on NYSE "Timer's Trend": We are still on the BUY signal on April 18, 2001.

____________________________ NYSE TIMER'S TREND  _______________________________
Mon 29 Jan 01        .  |  .  #    |10702.19  | .  +                 *
Tue 30 Jan 01        .  |  .  #    |10881.20  | .  +                      *
Wed 31 Jan 01        .  |  . #     |10887.36  | .  +                      *
Thu  1 Feb 01        .  |  .  #    |10983.63  |~.~~+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Fri  2 Feb 01        .  |  #       |10864.10  | .  +        *
Mon  5 Feb 01        .  |  . #     |10965.85  | .  +          *
Tue  6 Feb 01        .  |  . #     |10957.42  | . +           *
Wed  7 Feb 01        .  |  #       |10946.72  | . +           *
Thu  8 Feb 01        .  |  .#      |10880.55  | . +         *
Fri  9 Feb 01        .  |  #       |10781.45  | . +      *
Mon 12 Feb 01        .  |  .  #    |10946.77  | . +           *
Tue 13 Feb 01        .  |  .#      |10903.32  | . +          *
Wed 14 Feb 01        .  |  #       |10795.41  | . +       *
Thu 15 Feb 01        .  |  . #     |10891.02  | . +         *
Fri 16 Feb 01        .  |# .       |10799.82  | .+        *
Tue 20 Feb 01        .  |# .       |10730.88  | +       *
Wed 21 Feb 01        .  &  .       |10526.28  |~+~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 22 Feb 01        .  &  .       |10562.61  |+.             *
Fri 23 Feb 01        . #I  .       |10441.90  + .         *
Mon 26 Feb 01        .  I  .  #    |10642.53  |+.               *
Tue 27 Feb 01        .  I  #       |10636.88  |+.               *
Wed 28 Feb 01        .  I  .#      |10495.28  | + *-------------------
Thu  1 Mar 01        .  I# .       |10450.14  | +          *
Fri  2 Mar 01        .  |  .#      |10466.31  | .+         *
Mon  5 Mar 01        .  |  . #     |10562.30  | .+            *
Tue  6 Mar 01        .  |  .  #    |10591.22  | . +            *
Wed  7 Mar 01        .  |  .  #    |10729.60  | . +               *
Thu  8 Mar 01        .  |  .#      |10585.25  | .  +           *
Fri  9 Mar 01        .  |  .  #    |10644.62  | .  +            *
Mon 12 Mar 01       #.  I  .       |10208.25  | .+  *
Tue 13 Mar 01        .  &  .       |10290.80  | +     *
Wed 14 Mar 01       #.  I  .      {| 9873.46  |*+.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 15 Mar 01        .  I #.       |10031.28  + .               *
Fri 16 Mar 01       #.  I  .       | 9823.41  | -           *
Mon 19 Mar 01        .  I  #       | 9959.11  |-.              *
Tue 20 Mar 01        .  &  .       | 9720.76  |-.        *
Wed 21 Mar 01       #.  I  .       | 9487.00  |-.~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 22 Mar 01     #  .  I  .       | 9389.48  | .-        *
Fri 23 Mar 01        .  I  #       | 9504.78  |-.            *
Mon 26 Mar 01        .  I  . #     | 9687.53  |-.                 *
Tue 27 Mar 01        .  I  . #     | 9947.54  + .                        *
Wed 28 Mar 01        . #I  .       | 9785.35  |+.                   *
Thu 29 Mar 01        .  &  .       | 9799.06  | +                    *
Fri 30 Mar 01        .  I  #       | 9878.78  | +                      *
Mon  2 Apr 01        . #I  .       | 9777.93  |+.                   *
Tue  3 Apr 01    #   .  I  .       | 9485.71  | -            *
Wed  4 Apr 01        .# I  .       | 9515.42  | -             *
Thu  5 Apr 01        .  I  . #     | 9918.05  |-.                       *
Fri  6 Apr 01       #.  I  .       | 9791.09  | -                    *
Mon  9 Apr 01        .  I  #       | 9845.15  |-.                     *
Tue 10 Apr 01        .  |  .  #    |10102.74  |+.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Wed 11 Apr 01        .  &  .       |10013.47  | +           *
Thu 12 Apr 01        .  |  #       |10126.94  |+.               *
Mon 16 Apr 01        .  I #.       |10158.56  | +               *
Tue 17 Apr 01        .  |  .#      |10216.73  | .+               *
Wed 18 Apr 01        .  |  .   #  }|10615.83  |~.+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Thu 19 Apr 01        .  |  .#      |10693.71  | . +             *
Fri 20 Apr 01        .  #  .       |10579.85  | .+            *
Mon 23 Apr 01        .  #  .      [|10532.23  | .+          *
Tue 24 Apr 01        .  | #.       |10454.34  | +         *
Wed 25 Apr 01        .  |  . #    ]|10625.20  | +              *
Thu 26 Apr 01        .  |  .  #    |10692.35  | +               *
Fri 27 Apr 01        .  |  .   #   |10810.05  | . +                *
Mon 30 Apr 01        .  |  . #     |10734.97  | .  +             *
Tue  1 May 01        .  |  .  #    |10898.34  | .  +                   *
Wed  2 May 01        .  |  .#      |10876.68  | .  +                  *
Thu  3 May 01        .  |# .       |10795.65  | . +                 *
Fri  4 May 01        .  |  .  #    |10951.24  | . +                     *
Mon  7 May 01        .  |  .#      |10935.17  | . +                     *
Tue  8 May 01        .  |  #       |10883.51  | .+                     *
Wed  9 May 01        .  |  #       |10866.98  | .+                    *
Thu 10 May 01        .  |  . #     |10910.44  | . +                    *
Fri 11 May 01        .  |  #       |10821.31  | .+                   *
Mon 14 May 01        .  |  . #     |10877.33  | .+                    *
Tue 15 May 01        .  |  . #     |10872.97  | . +                   *
Wed 16 May 01        .  |  .    #  |11215.92  |~.~~+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Thu 17 May 01        .  |  .  #    |11248.58  | .  +            *
Fri 18 May 01        .  |  .  #    |11301.74 @| .   +            *
Mon 21 May 01        .  |  .   #   |11337.92 @| .   +             *
Tue 22 May 01        .  |  .#      |11257.24 @| .   +           *
Wed 23 May 01        .  |# .       |11105.51  | . +         *
Thu 24 May 01        .  |  #       |11122.42  | . +         *
Fri 25 May 01        .  | #.       |11005.37  | .+       *
Tue 29 May 01        .  | #.       |11039.14  | +         *
Wed 30 May 01        . #|  .       |10872.64  |+.    *
Thu 31 May 01        .  |  . #     |10911.94  | +     *
Fri  1 Jun 01        .  |  .#      |10990.41  | +       *
Mon  4 Jun 01        .  |  . #     |11061.52  | .+        *
Tue  5 Jun 01        .  |  .  #    |11175.84  | .+            *
Wed  6 Jun 01        .  | #.       |11070.24  | . +        *
Thu  7 Jun 01        .  |  .#      |11090.74  | . +        *
Fri  8 Jun 01        .  | #.       |10977.00  | .+      *
Mon 11 Jun 01        .  |# .       |10922.09  | .+    *
Tue 12 Jun 01        .  | #.       |10948.38  | +      *
Wed 13 Jun 01        .  | #.       |10871.62  | +    *
Thu 14 Jun 01        #  I  .       |10690.13  +~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fri 15 Jun 01        .  &  .       |10623.64  + .          *
Mon 18 Jun 01        .  &  .       |10645.38  + .           *
Tue 19 Jun 01        .  I# .       |10596.67  + .         *
Wed 20 Jun 01        .  I #.       |10647.33  + .           *
======================================================================== 

COMMENT on NASDAQ "Timer's Trend": We currently have a second waffling SELL signal on June 12, 2001. I still rate the NASDAQ as dead neutral. It is telling us that the techs should continue to be avoided.

____________________________ NASDAQ TIMER'S TREND  ____________________________
Mon 29 Jan 01        .  |  .  #    | 2838.34  | . +                *
Tue 30 Jan 01        .  |  .#      | 2838.35  | .+                 *
Wed 31 Jan 01        .  |  #       | 2772.73  | .+              *
Thu  1 Feb 01        .  |  .#      | 2782.79  | . +             *
Fri  2 Feb 01        .  #  .       | 2660.50  | .+         *
Mon  5 Feb 01        .  |# .      [| 2643.21  | +         *
Tue  6 Feb 01        .  |  .#      | 2664.49  | +          *
Wed  7 Feb 01        . #I  .      {| 2607.82  |+.        *
Thu  8 Feb 01        .  I# .       | 2562.06  |+.     *
Fri  9 Feb 01        #  I  .       | 2470.97  +~.~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mon 12 Feb 01        .  I #.       | 2489.66  + .            *
Tue 13 Feb 01        . #I  .       | 2427.72  |-.         *
Wed 14 Feb 01        .  I #.       | 2491.40  + .            *
Thu 15 Feb 01        .  I  .  #    | 2552.91  |+.               *
Fri 16 Feb 01      # .  I  .       | 2425.38  + .         *
Tue 20 Feb 01      # .  I  .       | 2318.35  |-.   *
Wed 21 Feb 01      # .  I  .       | 2268.94  |~-~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 22 Feb 01       #.  I  .       | 2244.96  | .-         *
Fri 23 Feb 01        #  I  .       | 2262.51  | .  -        *
Mon 26 Feb 01        .  I #.       | 2308.50  | .-            *
Tue 27 Feb 01      # .  I  .       | 2207.82  | .-       *
Wed 28 Feb 01       #.  I  .       | 2151.83  | .-  *
Thu  1 Mar 01        .# I  .       | 2183.37  | .-      *
Fri  2 Mar 01      # .  I  .       | 2117.63  | .-   *
Mon  5 Mar 01        .  &  .       | 2142.92  | . -   *
Tue  6 Mar 01        .  I  .#      | 2204.43  | -        *
Wed  7 Mar 01        .  &  .       | 2223.92  |-.         *
Thu  8 Mar 01        #  I  .       | 2168.73  |-.      *
Fri  9 Mar 01    #   .  I  .       | 2052.78  |~-*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mon 12 Mar 01  #     .  I  .       | 1923.36  | .-    *
Tue 13 Mar 01        .# I  .       | 2014.78  | .  -      *
Wed 14 Mar 01    #   .  I  .       | 1972.09 @| .   -   *
Thu 15 Mar 01     #  .  I  .       | 1940.71 @| .    - *
Fri 16 Mar 01   #    .  I  .       | 1890.91 @| .   *-
Mon 19 Mar 01        .# I  .       | 1951.18  | .  -   *
Tue 20 Mar 01    #   .  I  .       | 1857.44 @|~.~*~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Wed 21 Mar 01      # .  I  .       | 1830.23 @| .   -      *
Thu 22 Mar 01        #  I  .       | 1897.70  | .  -          *
Fri 23 Mar 01        .# I  .       | 1928.68  | . -             *
Mon 26 Mar 01        #  I  .       | 1918.49  | . -            *
Tue 27 Mar 01        .  &  .       | 1972.26  | .-               *
Wed 28 Mar 01   #    .  I  .       | 1854.13  | . -         *
Thu 29 Mar 01    #   .  I  .       | 1820.57  | . -       *
Fri 30 Mar 01        . #I  .       | 1840.26  | . -        *
Mon  2 Apr 01    #   .  I  .       | 1782.97  | .  -    *
Tue  3 Apr 01  #     .  I  .       | 1673.00 @|~.~~*~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Wed  4 Apr 01    #   .  I  .       | 1638.80 @| .    -    *
Thu  5 Apr 01        .  I #.       | 1785.00  | .  -             *
Fri  6 Apr 01    #   .  I  .       | 1720.36 @| .   -          *
Mon  9 Apr 01        .# I  .       | 1745.71  | .  -            *
Tue 10 Apr 01        .  I  #       | 1852.03  | .-                  *
Wed 11 Apr 01        .  I #.       | 1898.95  |-.                     *
Thu 12 Apr 01        .  I  #       | 1961.43  |-.                         *
Mon 16 Apr 01        #  I  .       | 1909.57  + .                      *
Tue 17 Apr 01        .  &  .       | 1923.22  |+.                       *
Wed 18 Apr 01        .  |  .  #    | 2079.44  |+.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Thu 19 Apr 01        .  |  . #     | 2182.14  | +                   *
Fri 20 Apr 01        .  | #.       | 2163.41  | +                  *
Mon 23 Apr 01        #  |  .       | 2059.32  | +              *
Tue 24 Apr 01        . #|  .       | 2016.61  |+.            *
Wed 25 Apr 01        .  |  .#      | 2059.80  |+.              *
Thu 26 Apr 01        .  #  .       | 2034.88  + .            *
Fri 27 Apr 01        .  |  .#      | 2075.68  + .               *
Mon 30 Apr 01        .  |  .  #   }| 2116.24  | +                *
Tue  1 May 01        .  |  .  #    | 2168.24  | . +                 *
Wed  2 May 01        .  |  .   #   | 2220.60  | . +                    *
Thu  3 May 01        .  #  .       | 2146.20  | . +                *
Fri  4 May 01        .  |  . #     | 2191.53  | . +                  *
Mon  7 May 01        .  | #.       | 2173.57  | . +                 *
Tue  8 May 01        .  |  . #     | 2198.77  | .+                    *
Wed  9 May 01        .  |# .       | 2156.63  | +                   *
Thu 10 May 01        .  | #.       | 2128.86  | .+                *
Fri 11 May 01        .  | #.       | 2107.43  | +                *
Mon 14 May 01        .  |# .       | 2081.92  | +               *
Tue 15 May 01        .  |  #       | 2085.58  |+.               *
Wed 16 May 01        .  |  .  #    | 2166.44  | +                   *
Thu 17 May 01        .  |  . #     | 2193.68  | .+                   *
Fri 18 May 01        .  |  .#      | 2198.88  | .+                    *
Mon 21 May 01        .  |  .    #  | 2305.59  | .  +                       *
Tue 22 May 01        .  |  .#      | 2313.85  | .  +                       *
Wed 23 May 01        .  |# .       | 2243.48  | . +                     *
Thu 24 May 01        .  |  . #     | 2282.02  | . +                       *
Fri 25 May 01        .  |  #       | 2251.03  | . +                     *
Tue 29 May 01        .  #  .       | 2175.54  | +                    *
Wed 30 May 01        #  I  .      {| 2084.50  |+.               *
Thu 31 May 01        .  I  . #    ]| 2110.49  | +                *
Fri  1 Jun 01        .  |  . #    }| 2149.44  | +                  *
Mon  4 Jun 01        .  |  .#      | 2155.93  | +                   *
Tue  5 Jun 01        .  |  .   #   | 2233.66  | .+                     *
Wed  6 Jun 01        .  |  #       | 2217.73  | . +                    *
Thu  7 Jun 01        .  |  . #     | 2264.00  | . +                      *
Fri  8 Jun 01        .  #  .       | 2215.10  | .+                     *
Mon 11 Jun 01        . #I  .       | 2170.78  | +                   *
Tue 12 Jun 01        .  I# .      {| 2169.95  |+.                   *
Wed 13 Jun 01        . #I  .       | 2121.66  + .                 *
Thu 14 Jun 01      # .  I  .       | 2044.07  | -             *
Fri 15 Jun 01        #  I  .       | 2028.43  | -            *
Mon 18 Jun 01      # .  I  .       | 1988.63  | .-         *
Tue 19 Jun 01        .# I  .       | 1992.66  | . -        *
Wed 20 Jun 01        . #I  .       | 2031.24  | . -          *
======================================================================== 
"Timer's Trend" is based on 4% and 10% exponential moving averages of the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ advance/decline lines (that is, the ratio of advancing to declining stocks). There are many symbols shown above, but the ones that count are the braces:
{, } = "Timer's Trend" (4% exponential confirmed by 10% exponential) SELL ({) or BUY (}) signal.

NEXT ISSUE - will appear sometime during the summer.     /Nick Chase