The Contrarian's View is published 11 times per year on a mostly-irregular schedule, and the views expressed are those of the author and editor, Nick Chase. Because nobody can predict the future, results of past suggestions or recommendations are no guarantee of future results. Material in this publication may be freely quoted provided proper attribution is given to its source. Subscription rate: Free on the Internet through the World-Wide Web service at Assumption College. Using your favorite Web-browsing program, Open URL http://nick.assumption.edu. Mailed paper subscriptions, one year for $39 to The Contrarian's View, 132 Moreland Street, Worcester, Massachusetts 01609. There is a limit of 50 paid subscribers at one time; please check for availability before sending any money. Sorry, Visa and Mastercard are not available. Overseas subscription rate, U.S. $54. Unsolicited material sent to us by UPS or by courier other than the postal service is refused and returned to sender! Phone: (508) 757-2881
But I don't expect the markets to slow-motion crash in a straight line, for which I have been criticized as "turning bullish". To see what I mean, it pays to take a look at what actually happened to Japanese stocks in the 1990s. The Japanese central bank began its easing (with a lowering of the discount rate, from 6% to 4.5% in steps) a full year and a half after the Nikkei peak in late 1989. This was a case of too little too late.... the confidence of the Japanese consumer had already been broken, and the effect on stocks was small, only about a 15% bounce followed by a later plunge to a bottom in 1992. But the second set of rate cuts, from 4.5% to 1.75% over three years, helped drive stocks to a greater than 50% gain (before they again plunged to new lows in 1995). And a third set of rate cuts, from 1.75% to 1/2% in 1995, again led to a Nikkei rally by greater than half in 1995 and 1996, before stocks returned to the doldrums.
Now, of course, at 0.15%.... or recently, no set target at all.... the Japanese bank authorities are out of maneuvering room. Well, I suppose they could pay you to borrow money, but in today's psychological climate I'm not at all sure even that would have the desired effect. (In the 1930s, they called this "pushing on a string".) The Japanese stock market now tends to follow the bumps and grinds of the economy, as the 1999-2000 rocket ride shows, rather than governmental or central-bank action.
In this sense, the Japanese central bank has "lost control", not in a spectacular crash of asset values, but over time as it ran out of options to turn around consumer and investor confidence. This is more or less how I expect our Federal Reserve to lose control.... not in a flash, but over the years as the overhang of unliquidated debt which created this bubble becomes more oppressive.
But Alan "ease early, ease often" Greenspan has been quicker on the trigger than the Japanese were, so the pattern we trace will differ. What we may see is a variation of what happened in the 1970s, where the "go-go" era of the 1960s ended in the 1970 bear (today's equivalent: the NASDAQ bubble crashing in the 2000-2001 bear), followed by the "Nifty Fifty" craze of 1972-73 as investors shunned the '60s conglomerates and high-tech stuff in favor of so-called "one-decision" stocks. The "one decision" supposedly was, you had to decide only what to buy, because the "Nifty Fifty" were such great long-term growth companies that you would never need to sell. The "one decision" should have been my rule #2.... formerly rule #1.... of investing, don't overpay for the merchandise, because in the 1973-74 recession these never-to-be sold blue-chippers were indeed sold as investors yanked their money from mutual funds which had been going backwards for a half-decade, and the fund managers were forced to sell to meet redemptions.
My guess is that, this time around, the bubble will reassert itself in the stocks that declined the least during the recent demise of the NASDAQ bubble. That would be in so-called "value" stocks, stocks that didn't participate very much in the recent bubble but instead maintained some semblance of being reasonably priced, and in the stocks that make up the popular averages, particularly the Dow and S&P 500, because these have the implicit price-fixing of the "plunge protection team".
Initial indications are that, in spite of Greenspan easing earlier than the Japanese did, the bullish jag in stocks that's just around the corner will be weak. This is probably because (a) of the enormous overhang of debt.... margin, home-equity loans, credit-card debt.... that people have either directly or indirectly taken on to play in the stock market, and (b) even after the current bear has taken its toll, stocks still remain historically overvalued in relation to GDP, and are still more overvalued than Japanese stocks were at their peak in 1989.
This translates into marginal new highs for the Dow.... around 12,500, could go as high as 14,000.... and for the S&P 500, but the NASDAQ is probably toast for at least a decade, maybe for a generation. The NASDAQ might get as high as 4200 in the next "bull market", which should more properly be called a bear-market rally, but more likely will top out in the high 3000s as a different set of tech-type stocks catches the public's fancy. And I'm looking at a period of about two years (a la "Nifty Fifty") - 2002 and 2003, maybe? - before these highs are attained and a new, more severe recession brings back the bear.
Long-term, my outlook has not changed. We are in a major, decade-long deflationary bear market. In theory, it should last ten to twelve years (as did the previous inflationary bear, 1970-82, or the Japanese bear, 1990-2001 and still counting). However, around 2010 demographics will start working against the stock market.... the baby-boomers will need to sell their stocks to pay their retirement expenses (you can't eat stocks, after all, you have to convert them to cash to pay for the things you need), and mutual funds will see persistent net redemptions.... so the deflationary bear could grind on for a generation. Or, maybe by 2010 everybody will have already abandoned stocks as hopeless, and it's the bond, commodities or precious-metals markets that will take the demographic hit.... we'll see.
What is now unfolding is a major shift in expectations. People caught up in the bubble of the previous five years are waking up and realizing that they're not going to retire in six years by buying in their 401(k)s shares of the dot-com they work for. They're beginning to realize that their retirement portfolios are not going to continue compounding at 15% to 18% per year forever. As the decade unfolds they will finally realize that "buy and hold for the long term" is a myth, it only works in bull markets, and for buy-and-hold to work at all one needs to be fortunate enough to retire and "cash in" at the tail end of a bull market, not in the depths of a bear market. They may even discover the joys of diversification. And a few of them will even be clever enough to tune out the perpetually-bullish smiling shills of Wall Street who glut the boob tube.
What is now unfolding is a trader's decade. The path is down, but not in a straight line. The Fed will periodically ease by lowering the interest rates it controls and by releasing gobs of freshly-minted money, and this will periodically lead to what will be hailed as a "new bull market" which will, in hindsight, prove to be a bear-market rally.
What is unfolding is a decade in which long-neglected markets reawaken, perhaps not immediately, certainly not predictably, but several years out they will be much higher than today. Think gold and gold shares.... now at the bottom of a 21-year bear market. Everybody has given up on gold, it's going nowhere, because the central banks can depress its price with selling, or even the threat of selling. But as the Fed loses control, this will likely translate into a weak dollar (in absolute terms; the world's other paper currencies may remain even weaker than the dollar) and higher prices for gold.
Think Japan. Everybody's given up on it, the pros see no hope for
Japanese stocks, the political
situation looks hopeless. Maybe, Japan has nowhere to go but up.
Certainly, Japanese shares currently are a better value than U.S.
shares, especially when you consider the Japanese are prodigious
savers (and thus builders of capital), while we are profligate
borrowers and spenders.
In fact the most powerful man in the world doesn't answer questions from the media. Occasionally he trots up to Congress and bores everybody silly, but he would never sit down and explain in plain English why he failed to cut interest rates last fall when even Pamela Anderson knew the economy was shaky. Alan Greenspan is out of control. Take that to the bank. The guy messed up big time and now will not explain himself. The last time Greenspan was seen in public was at the ultra-expensive "Le Cirque" restaurant in New York City. Have you ever been to "Le Cirque"? It's good, but you won't get out of there for under a hundred bucks and that's with a glass of wine, not a bottle. While millions of Americans are watching in horror as their mutual funds wither, Greenspan is living large. Let 'em eat cake. - Bill O'Reilly [Nick's comment: Hero worship when stocks go up, brickbats when stocks go down.]
That great champion of journalistic freedom, Al Gore, invited Mr. Greenspan to speak in his journalism class at Columbia last week. Greenspan has no room on his schedule for press conferences but he took the time to travel from Washington to New York to be with Al and the students. However, when those students began asking Greenspan about the economy (and they didn't even use the word "stupid"), Gore cut them off. There would be no specific questions from students of journalism in Al's class. No way. Mr. Greenspan was not there to actually talk about the real world -- he was there only to talk about theory. I bet that was worth every penny of the Ivy League tuition those students are paying. - Bill O'Reilly
The principal element that defines a bear market is psychological. In a nutshell, the stock market continues to head lower despite the common perception that prices are already at a fair value. For example, the Dow declines 10% to 15% over a period of several weeks. The index then begins to rise again and market analysts proclaim that a bottom was in place and higher prices are in the near future. The Dow then proceeds to fall even further than it had before setting a new low. Analysts once again proclaim a bottom but once again, the Dow falls even further still after a brief rally. It is the cycle of lower highs and lower lows that is the heart of the bear market experience. Investors who were fervently bullish at the stock market's peak will gradually lose their confidence as they are continually disappointed. There could be good economic news or stellar earnings that would send the market up briefly but it would always fall back again -- often on no significant news.... Months or even years later, the stock market would finally achieve a bottom. However, at the bottom of a true bear market, you won't hear about the possibility that stocks have made a final low. You are more likely to hear that stocks will head even lower. - Marc Sexton [Nick's comment: Very accurate description, but unfortunately there is no consistent way to measure when a psychological extreme.... and therefore a final bottom.... has been reached. After the fact it always seems obvious, but not before.]
America's bubble market of the 1990s was made possible by a single overriding conceit: that America's new Information Economy is different from every economy that ever came before and doesn't need to follow the same old rules. The illusion is so far-reaching that it has led Americans to believe that they actually got richer over the last decade. But while Americans celebrated their "information economy" and thought it was making them rich, they were actually getting poorer - a fact which cannot be ignored forever. - Bill Bonner
The single hardest concept to get over to investors is that there are tidal movements in the market. The bull tide takes stocks from undervalue to overvalue. The bear tide corrects the bull movement as it takes stocks back to undervalue again. Why can't people accept this? Probably because it too simple, too basic, and too theoretical. - Richard Russell
People get not what they expect from their investments but what they deserve. Quick profits are lost just as quickly. Little gains, accumulated over many years, tend to remain for many years. If it were not so - everyone would always go for the quick gains. And if that were to happen, the gains would disappear - like a lush island that is suddenly overrun by herds of grazing animals. - Bill Bonner
Two stockbrokers whom I have known for more than 15 years called me today. They are toast. The first one saw his account drop from 800k to 70k and today he is being forced to liquidate his account to cover his margin. Lesson - margin costs a lot more than 8% a year. The second one saw his account go from 400K to 30k - how, he borrowed money to fund his margin calls - now he owes that money too. Yesterday [March 20] and this morning I saw the first signs of the capitulation process. It is just beginning. Stocks begin to trade with wider spreads. - Karim Rahemtulla
A year ago, Yahoo! was a 'must own' New Economy company. And a share in Yahoo! would have set you back about $200. Today, you should be able to get it for $20. Investors have lost about $90 billion on this single company. How could they have been so reckless with their money?.... But even at $20 a share, Yahoo! is worth more than $11 billion - which is a lot of money for a company with gross sales of only about $180 million per quarter...and headed in the wrong direction. In fact, it's 58 times this year's earnings. As earnings decline that P/E number will go up - making the company even more preposterously overvalued. What's a good price for Yahoo!? Who knows? But bear markets typically cut from 90% to 99% off the leading tech shares. At $2...and a P/E of 8 or so...Yahoo! could be a good deal. - Bill Bonner
As of December 2000, market cap ($14.8 trillion) was 146% of nominal GDP ($10.1 trillion). This ludicrous market number is a direct result of trillions of dollars in credit dumped directly into stocks. That credit, by definition, is credit in excess of real economic activity (as defined by GDP). What results is a historical misallocation of capital. Historically, market cap averages about 52% of GDP - which would leave us with a decline of about $9 trillion from current levels to get back to historic averages. - Daniel Denning [Nick's comment: And that's after lopping off $4 trillion paper value since the highs in early 2000.]
I've argued that the personal savings rate is much higher than zero. It is widely known that the government statisticians treat capital gains taxes as a tax on personal income to calculate disposable income. But they don't add the capital gains to pre-tax income. A more symmetric approach would also exclude the taxes on capital gains, thus boosting disposable income and the personal savings rate. Another statistical issue is that the government data include corporate contributions to pension funds as personal income, not benefits paid. This statistically correct approach is behaviorally weird. Retirees think of their retirement income as income, and spend it accordingly. In 1999, benefits paid exceeded contributions by $256 billion, explaining at least four percentage points of the weakness in the personal savings rate. - Ed Yardeni
Never before in U.S. history has this much capital built up on the market sidelines with only one place to go. Where? Back into stocks and mutual funds! Institutions get "paid to play," plain and simple - not to stockpile cash on the market sidelines. And individuals aren't going to settle for 5% annual growth in money market funds, giving up their dreams for a lavish retirement, the kids' college education, or that special dream house. And that means there's a MONSTROUS BUYING PANIC coming soon. I beg you, this is the most important decision you'll make in your entire investing career - don't let Wall Street fool you into making the wrong one! - Michael Murphy [Nick's comment: It does make more sense to buy near the bottom (NASDAQ under 2000) than near the top (NASDAQ over 5000)]
It was less than twenty years ago, but the Japanese boom seems to have fallen into a black hole of memory. In the 1980s, Japan's GDP growth followed almost exactly the pattern of the U.S. in the 90s, beginning the decade with a growth rate of about 2% and ending it growing at 6.3%. The Nikkei index, meanwhile, performed even more spectacularly: it was only 6,500 at the beginning of decade and nearly 39,000 at its close. For reference - or amusement - the Nikkei is now below 12,000 and the economy's growth rate is about zero. Nor did the Japanese sit idly eating their raw fish as Japan, Inc. went belly up.... Interest rates were reduced to zero and public spending (a.k.a. fiscal stimulus) went wild.... Could it be, dear reader, that Japan's economic problem - and America's - is not something than can be solved? A collapse may not be avoidable. Instead, perhaps it must be endured. Like death, it is merely a question of when and how - not if. - Bill Bonner
After the Japanese bubble popped, American economists began hectoring Japan's government to do something about it. Japanese officials were urged to lower interest rates, increase government spending, and "restructure" the economy, along American lines. No dopes, the Japanese lowered interest rates to zero, and spent more money on public works than any government in history. On restructuring, however, the evidence is mixed. Whatever they did, it didn't work. But American economists are sure that if Japan had merely listened more carefully, the 'lost decade' in Japan would never had happened. - Bill Bonner [Nick's comment: The dopes are not the Japanese.]
Japan is not exactly a basket-case. Its economy grew by 0.8% in
the last quarter of last year. And corporate profits are better
than those in the U.S. Throughout the 1990s - supposedly Japan's
'Lost Decade' - GDP still grew at an average rate of 1.8% per
year. This was lower than in the U.S., but still higher than
France and Switzerland. - Bill Bonner [Nick's comment: Similar to
the 1970s in the U.S. The economy here continued to grow, but
stocks generally went nowhere until the summer of 1982. Biggest
difference: ours was inflationary, theirs is deflationary.]
The history for stock behavior during the six months following the third rate cut (March 20) is for them to trade as much as 7% lower to as much as 40% higher, and they typically will close out the six-month period substantially higher. So far, we've matched that 7% lower. In September, we'll see if I'm right about prices consistently being higher during a Fed easing sequence.
The question, of course, is whether the Federal Reserve's easing will succeed again this time, as it has every time since World War II, or whether it will fail this time as it did during the Great Depression. Those expecting the Fed to fail have an excellent case, considering the magnitude of the bubble that preceded this bear. But it's my opinion that.... at least this time around.... the Fed has plenty of room to ease, and fiscal policy (translation: tax cut) is also swinging into place to boost consumers' spending power, contrary to what happened during the Depression when taxes were raised. The easing has begun soon enough to turn around consumer confidence (unlike Japan in the early 1990s), and interest rates are declining enough to entice consumers to refinance their debts, and thus maintain their purchasing juggernaut.
Though I think we're close to the intermediate bottom, it doesn't seem to be quite in place yet.... but I don't think we'll have long to wait, nor will we see substantially lower lows on the NYSE. And technical evidence suggests the turnaround will arrive within a month's time, that is, sometime in April.
Though indications are that the bear-market rally will ultimately be weak.... with marginal new highs in the Dow.... its initiation is likely to be explosive.
You want to be on board before this happens, not playing catch-up. Pick one of those really dismal trading days, with multi-hundred-point losses in the Dow and a hundred-point loss in the NASDAQ, to stake out your position. Stay away from the NASDAQ stuff, stick to so-called "value" stocks or index funds for the upward ride, that's where the best action with relative safety will be found.
So far, I think I've managed to tick off just about everybody over the past six years. First, I declined to play the 1995-2000 bubble with my retirement funds, since I had no prior trading experience in one and this was, after all, my retirement. My fear was that things would become so strung out that a surprise systemic failure would suddenly crash the markets (as in 1987). Note to those who think this was being unduly cautious: We did have two systemic failures, in 1997 and again in 1998, but the Fed was able to bail us out of both. Those outcomes, in my opinion, were not guaranteed.... either could have snowballed into a systemic crash.
Then, just as the bear market was really picking up steam in January 2001, I "turned bullish" (as my detractors have put it).... that is, I expected stocks to turn around within a few months of the initial Fed easing in early January.
As is usual for me, I was too early. The bear continued to grind on in February and March, and the explosive rally I expect has yet to make an appearance.
Is there anybody left to annoy? Especially among those who (like me) have felt that the greedy folks who participated in the bubble fully deserve their comeuppance? Probably not.
But really, folks, you wouldn't expect me to remain short-term
bearish when the major media news magazines (the personification
of herd instinct) have pictures of those vicious, furry, grizzly
things on their front covers, would you? After all, this is The
Contrarian's View.
Original cost (adjusted): $ 4,998.21 Present value: $ 4,119.81 Increase: $ -878.40 [-17.57%]
The performance of this portfolio and its predecessors ("Hedger's Delight", "Present and Future Income", "Crapshooter's Folly") from January 1987 to the present is -6.53%, for a compound annual rate of return of -0.46%. COMMENT on "Phoenix": There is no change since the last issue (Cash balance is not up to date).
B. "Professors' Investment Group (PIG)" - investment club portfolio.
SUMMARY - "PIG":
Original cost: $ 9,024.00 Present value: $15,316.93 Increase: $ 6,292.93 [+69.74%]COMMENT on "PIG": The PIGs asked me to sell about half of the Prudent Bear Fund holding (a little profit-taking here) and to buy $1000 worth of a mutual fund holding Japanese stocks, such as Fidelity Japan or Scudder Japan or possibly the NYSE-traded Japan Fund, my choice. I cashed in 350 Prudent Bear Shares on March 30 at $5.31; this has yet to settle.
At the March meeting, the PIGs discussed Genzyme Transgenics at some length. The product in development for which we originally bought the shares successfully passed its FDA trials, but the potential market is only to a subset of the size originally intended, thus the product is uneconomic to produce. The patented technology, though, is good for a few more years, and our resident expert on this technology expects another bounce in the stock after the technology is successfully applied elsewhere, at which point the PIGs hope to dump the stock (our original premise not having been fulfilled).
The PIGs' Web page is at http://www.assumption.edu/HTML/Faculty/Kantar/WPigs.html
C. Roth rollover IRA - real portfolio, includes commissions:
SUMMARY - IRA:
Original (1983-86) cost: $ 8,326.19 Present value: $10,024.73 Increase: $ 1,698.54 [+20.40%]
The performance of this portfolio (including its predecessors)
from January 1, 1987 to the present is -8.59%, for a compound
annual rate of return of -0.62%.
D. CREF Pension plan; I switch between indexed stock/bond/money funds:
Date Sold Bought
13Mar1992 stock @ 56.65 MM @ 13.41
29Apr1992 MM @ 13.48 bond @ 31.19
19Jun1992 bond @ 32.14 MM @ 13.55
29Jun1992 MM @ 13.57 stock @ 56.74
24Jul1992 stock @ 56.76 MM @ 13.61
29Oct1992 MM @ 13.72 stock @ 58.61
23Dec1992 stock @ 61.48 MM @ 13.78
16Jan1995 MM @ 14.83 equity-index @ 26.44
20Jan1995 eq-index @ 26.19 MM @ 14.84
30Oct1997 MM@ 17.24 bond@47.56 (27.17%)
30Oct1997 MM@ 17.24 i-i bond@26.12 (27.17%)
11Feb1998 bond@ 48.84 MM@17.52 (27.17%)
11Feb1998 I-I bond@ 26.23 MM@17.52(27.17%)
16Jun1998 MM@ 17.84 TIAA Traditional (45.87%)
23Sep1999 MM@18.99 I-I bond@27.56 (53.32%)
17-18May2000 rate adjustment to 7.25% in SRA
12-13Jul2000 rate adjustment to 7.5% in SRA
8Jan2001 TIAA Traditional bond@58.62 [22.77%]
8Jan2001 TIAA Traditional eq-idx@75.79 [4.56%]
1Feb2001 i-i bond@31.78 eq-idx@80.84 [26.76%]
Values, 30Mar2001: stock, 164.58; equity-index, 68.38; MM, 20.69;
bond, 59.40; inflation-indexed bond, 32.54; TIAA current yield in
SRA, 7.5% (new money at 6.5% through June 30, 2001)
Gain, 1988: 18.91%; 1989: 14.48%; 1990: 8.28%; 1991: 27.93%; 1992: 10.20%; 1993: 3.08%; 1994: 4.07%; 1995: 4.80%; 1996: 5.28%; 1997: 5.38%; 1998: 5.72%; 1999: 5.12%
Gain, January 1 through December 31, 2000: 9.99%
Total gain since January 1, 1988 (13 years): 216.83%
Compound annual rate of return: 9.28% (My long-term target: in excess of 10%)
Gain shown excludes the impact of additional monthly cash contributions.
Buying CREF stock on January 1, 1988 and holding it gained
503.36%, for a compound annual rate of return of 14.83%.
COMMENT on NYSE "Timer's Trend":
We are on a (somewhat waffling)
SELL given March 14, 2001. I am bucking "Timer's Trend" at the
moment, expecting a humongous NYSE rally will arrive without
warning in the next few weeks.
____________________________ NYSE TIMER'S TREND _______________________________
Mon 29 Jan 01 . | . # |10702.19 | . + *
Tue 30 Jan 01 . | . # |10881.20 | . + *
Wed 31 Jan 01 . | . # |10887.36 | . + *
Thu 1 Feb 01 . | . # |10983.63 |~.~~+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
Fri 2 Feb 01 . | # |10864.10 | . + *
Mon 5 Feb 01 . | . # |10965.85 | . + *
Tue 6 Feb 01 . | . # |10957.42 | . + *
Wed 7 Feb 01 . | # |10946.72 | . + *
Thu 8 Feb 01 . | .# |10880.55 | . + *
Fri 9 Feb 01 . | # |10781.45 | . + *
Mon 12 Feb 01 . | . # |10946.77 | . + *
Tue 13 Feb 01 . | .# |10903.32 | . + *
Wed 14 Feb 01 . | # |10795.41 | . + *
Thu 15 Feb 01 . | . # |10891.02 | . + *
Fri 16 Feb 01 . |# . |10799.82 | .+ *
Tue 20 Feb 01 . |# . |10730.88 | + *
Wed 21 Feb 01 . & . |10526.28 |~+~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 22 Feb 01 . & . |10562.61 |+. *
Fri 23 Feb 01 . #I . |10441.90 + . *
Mon 26 Feb 01 . I . # |10642.53 |+. *
Tue 27 Feb 01 . I # |10636.88 |+. *
Wed 28 Feb 01 . I .# |10495.28 | + *-------------------
Thu 1 Mar 01 . I# . |10450.14 | + *
Fri 2 Mar 01 . | .# |10466.31 | .+ *
Mon 5 Mar 01 . | . # |10562.30 | .+ *
Tue 6 Mar 01 . | . # |10591.22 | . + *
Wed 7 Mar 01 . | . # |10729.60 | . + *
Thu 8 Mar 01 . | .# |10585.25 | . + *
Fri 9 Mar 01 . | . # |10644.62 | . + *
Mon 12 Mar 01 #. I . |10208.25 | .+ *
Tue 13 Mar 01 . & . |10290.80 | + *
Wed 14 Mar 01 #. I . {| 9873.46 |*+.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 15 Mar 01 . I #. |10031.28 + . *
Fri 16 Mar 01 #. I . | 9823.41 | - *
Mon 19 Mar 01 . I # | 9959.11 |-. *
Tue 20 Mar 01 . & . | 9720.76 |-. *
Wed 21 Mar 01 #. I . | 9487.00 |-.~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 22 Mar 01 # . I . | 9389.48 | .- *
Fri 23 Mar 01 . I # | 9504.78 |-. *
Mon 26 Mar 01 . I . # | 9687.53 |-. *
Tue 27 Mar 01 . I . # | 9947.54 + . *
Wed 28 Mar 01 . #I . | 9785.35 |+. *
Thu 29 Mar 01 . & . | 9799.06 | + *
Fri 30 Mar 01 . I # | 9878.78 | + *
========================================================================
COMMENT on NASDAQ "Timer's Trend": We currently have a SELL signal
on February 7, 2001. The NASDAQ remains solidly in bear mode as
the techs disappear to near-oblivion.... stay away 'til we're
near 1500 for the NASDAQ average (which I think will be a reasonable entry point).
____________________________ NASDAQ TIMER'S TREND ____________________________
Mon 29 Jan 01 . | . # | 2838.34 | . + *
Tue 30 Jan 01 . | .# | 2838.35 | .+ *
Wed 31 Jan 01 . | # | 2772.73 | .+ *
Thu 1 Feb 01 . | .# | 2782.79 | . + *
Fri 2 Feb 01 . # . | 2660.50 | .+ *
Mon 5 Feb 01 . |# . [| 2643.21 | + *
Tue 6 Feb 01 . | .# | 2664.49 | + *
Wed 7 Feb 01 . #I . {| 2607.82 |+. *
Thu 8 Feb 01 . I# . | 2562.06 |+. *
Fri 9 Feb 01 # I . | 2470.97 +~.~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mon 12 Feb 01 . I #. | 2489.66 + . *
Tue 13 Feb 01 . #I . | 2427.72 |-. *
Wed 14 Feb 01 . I #. | 2491.40 + . *
Thu 15 Feb 01 . I . # | 2552.91 |+. *
Fri 16 Feb 01 # . I . | 2425.38 + . *
Tue 20 Feb 01 # . I . | 2318.35 |-. *
Wed 21 Feb 01 # . I . | 2268.94 |~-~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Thu 22 Feb 01 #. I . | 2244.96 | .- *
Fri 23 Feb 01 # I . | 2262.51 | . - *
Mon 26 Feb 01 . I #. | 2308.50 | .- *
Tue 27 Feb 01 # . I . | 2207.82 | .- *
Wed 28 Feb 01 #. I . | 2151.83 | .- *
Thu 1 Mar 01 .# I . | 2183.37 | .- *
Fri 2 Mar 01 # . I . | 2117.63 | .- *
Mon 5 Mar 01 . & . | 2142.92 | . - *
Tue 6 Mar 01 . I .# | 2204.43 | - *
Wed 7 Mar 01 . & . | 2223.92 |-. *
Thu 8 Mar 01 # I . | 2168.73 |-. *
Fri 9 Mar 01 # . I . | 2052.78 |~-*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mon 12 Mar 01 # . I . | 1923.36 | .- *
Tue 13 Mar 01 .# I . | 2014.78 | . - *
Wed 14 Mar 01 # . I . | 1972.09 @| . - *
Thu 15 Mar 01 # . I . | 1940.71 @| . - *
Fri 16 Mar 01 # . I . | 1890.91 @| . *-
Mon 19 Mar 01 .# I . | 1951.18 | . - *
Tue 20 Mar 01 # . I . | 1857.44 @|~.~*~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Wed 21 Mar 01 # . I . | 1830.23 @| . - *
Thu 22 Mar 01 # I . | 1897.70 | . - *
Fri 23 Mar 01 .# I . | 1928.68 | . - *
Mon 26 Mar 01 # I . | 1918.49 | . - *
Tue 27 Mar 01 . & . | 1972.26 | .- *
Wed 28 Mar 01 # . I . | 1854.13 | . - *
Thu 29 Mar 01 # . I . | 1820.57 | . - *
Fri 30 Mar 01 . #I . | 1840.26 | . - *
========================================================================
"Timer's Trend" is based on 4% and 10% exponential moving averages of the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ advance/decline lines (that is, the ratio of advancing to declining stocks). There are many symbols shown above, but the ones that count are the braces: NEXT ISSUE - will appear about April 30. /Nick Chase